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COMMENTS
services of these entrepreneurs? Doubtless the court is not
inconsiderate of unattractive ancillary aspects to the proposed
laws, its attitude being at least the more definite as a con-
sequence. Thus, for the people of Massachusetts to ease the
housing shortage by encouraging new building and/or to aid
the veteran-it being impossible to determine definitely which,
if either, is the primary intent-in the exact manner proposed,
leaves them as their first task the formation of a new article
of amendment to the constitution as were their predecessors
forced to do in a like situation nearly forty years ago.3 1
DIXON F. SPIvi
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PARI-MUTUEL BETTING UNDER
STATE ANTI-LOTTERY PROVISIONS
In the recent case of Longstreth v. Cook,' the Supreme Court
of Arkansas, in a divided opinion, held that a statute legalizing
pari-mutuel betting on horse races does not violate the following
provision of the Arkansas Constitution: "No lottery shall be
authorized by this state, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be
allowed.
'2
That the pari-mutuel system of betting on horse races consti-
tutes gambling cannot be questioned. The issue involved in the
Longstreth case, however, is whether it constitutes that form
of gambling known as a lottery. The latter is defined as:
A scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance;
especially, a scheme by which one or more prizes are dis-
tributed by chance among persons who have paid or
promised a consideration for a chance to win them, usually
as determined by the numbers on tickets as drawn from
a lottery wheel.3
A lottery consists of three essential elements: prize, con-
sideration, and chance. 4 Unquestionably, the first two elements
are present in wagering on horse races. It is the last of these
requisites, chance, which controls the determination of the issue
31. Following Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N.E. 611 (1912)
there proceeded certain amendments to the constitution to allow that which
had been declared void. See note 3 supra.
1. 220 SW.2d 433 (Ark. 1949).
2. ARK. CONST. Art. XIX, § 14.
3. WBqTR' NFIV INT'L DICTIONARY 1461 (2d ed. 1945).
4. 34 C. J. LOTTERIES, § 3, p. 649; 54 C. J. LOTTERIES, § 2, p. 845.
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before the court in the principal case. In order to constitute
a lottery, it is essential not only that the element of chance is
present, but also that it controls or dominates the awarding
of the prize. When the element of chance is combined with
skill or judgment in order to determine the winning prize, and
skill or judgment is the dominating element, it is not a lottery;
if chance controls, an opposite conclusion will be reached.5
In the view of the court in the principal case, this necessary
degree of chance is lacking because the bettor possesses the
opportunity to exercise his reason, judgment, sagacity or dis-
cretion, and the outcome of the race depends on many factors
outside the realm of chance. The reasoning of the court in
arriving at this conclusion is set out in the following extract:
Every event in life and fulfillment of every lawful contract
entered into between parties is contingent to at least some
slight extent upon chance. No one would contend, how-
ever, that a contract knowingly entered into between two
parties is a gaming contract merely because its fulfillment
was prevented as a result of unknown or unconsidered
forces, or by the issue of certain conditions, or by the result
of fortuity. The pari-mutuel system of betting does not
come within the definition mentioned above. [The defini-
tion mentioned is that quoted from Webster, supra.] While
the amount of money to be divided is indefinite as to
dollars and cents, it is definite in that the amount of money
to be divided is the total stakes on the winning horse, less
a given percentage to the management. The persons
among whom the money is to be divided are not uncertain,
as they are "those who bet on the winning horse". The
winning horse is not determined by chance, alone, but the
condition, speed, and endurance of the horse, aided by the
skill and management of the rider or driver, enter into
the result.6
Assuming that wagering on horse races does not constitute
a lottery per se, the question is simply whether the use of the
pari-mutuel system of betting affects this conclusion. The
pari-mutuel machine is defined as "A machine for registering
and indicating the number and nature of bets made on horse
races used in the pari-mutuel system of betting"7 and the
definition of the system is "A form of betting on horses in
5. Ibid.
6. Longstreth v. Cook, 220 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Ark. 1949).
7. WEBSTEa's NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1717 (2d ed. 1945).
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which those who bet on the winning horse share the total
stakes, less a small per cent to the management."8
The court in the instant case, although without referring
to the decision, follows the rule laid down in Utah State Fair
Ass'n v. Green? and reasons that the use of the pari-mutuel
machine, which in no way can affect the result of the race, but
is merely a convenient mechanical device which greatly ex-
pedites the recording and tabulation of information regarding
the number and nature of bets, will not make wagering on
horse races a lottery if it is not otherwise so.
The dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Smith in the
Longstreth case considers a number of factors. (1) The pari-
mutuel system is itself a misnomer, as it does not consist of
mutual wagers and there is no privity of contract between the
bettors. (2) The pari-mutuel system is similar to the lottery
system in that the operators entertain no risk of loss. Operators
merely accept the bets, deduct their percentage, and balance
off the remainder among the winners. (3) The majority opinion
indulges in a play on words when the court states, "The persons
among whom the money is to be divided are not uncertain, as
they are 'those who bet on the winning horse."' The dissent
maintains that the amount and winners are indefinite, and that
only the method by which they are to be determined is definite.
(4) Many of the bettors do not rely on their judgment and
reasoning in arriving at their choice, and even among those
who do, not one can be found who is able to win consistently.
Only two cases in point can be found, decided since the turn
of the century, that seem to uphold the opinion of the two dis-
senting justices in the instant case; and, upon a closer perusal,
their weight may be seriously questioned. One is State v. Ak-
Sar-Ben Exposition Co.,1" which can be clearly distinguished
since the Constitution of Nebraska then in force made no dis-
tinction between gambling and lottery; the prohibition applied
to both equally. Almost all states have constitutional provisions
prohibiting lotteries, but not gambling, leaving the latter phase
to special legislation or local enforcement. The Nebraska
Constitution has since been revised to conform to those of
other states. A second decision which in substance agreed with
8. Ibid.
9. 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926).
10. 118 Neb. 851, 226 N.W. 705 (1929).
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the dissent in the Longstreth case is Opinion of the Justices."
This is an advisory opinion given by the Alabama Supreme
Court at the request of the legislature on the question of whether
a proposed statute legalizing the bookmaking and pari-mutuel
system of betting on horse races and dog races would be con-
stitutional. In a four-to-three decision, the court advised the
legislature that such a statute would violate the constitution's
anti-lottery clause. The reasoning employed by the majority
was that, although skill and judgment might go into the de-
termination of the winner, the fact that the amount to be won
is unknown makes it a lottery. The dissent in the advisory
opinion, while giving a detailed resume of the Alabama and
United States decisions generally, maintained that since skill
and judgment did go into the determination of the winner,
that is sufficient to take it out of the anti-lottery clause.
In conclusion, it is submitted that however sound may seem
the argument of the dissent in the Longstreth case it is for
the legislatures and not the courts to judge the relative merits
and evils of such gambling legislation. A careful study of the
decided cases indicates that the principal case is in accord with
the weight of authority in the United States today. 12
BURTON A. LIBRACH
PERSONAL PROPERTY-FINDER V. LIFE TENANT, LIFE TEN-
ANT V. REMAINDERMAN-Plaintiffs, while swimming in a
newly dug canal of the Chariton River in Missouri, discovered
an ancient Indian canoe. One end was imbedded nine feet
in the bank, the other rose six inches above the water. One
Nina Haney held a life estate in the river bank, and Ella Evans
held the remainder in fee. Biegel, one of the defendants, aided
the plaintiffs in removing the canoe from the bank; when he
refused to give up the find, the plaintiffs began this action of
replevin. Prior to the bringing of the action, the plaintiffs
had purchased all of the rights which the life tenant of the
real estate had in the canoe. The remainderman intervened.
11. 248 Ala. 516, 31 So.2d 753 (1947).
12. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N.E. 439 (1932); Commonwealth
v. Ky. Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 38 S.W.2d 987 (1931); Roban v. Detroit
Racing Ass'n, 314 Mich. 326, 22 N.W.2d 433 (1946); Utah State Fair
Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926).
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